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Shocks to bank lending, risk-taking and securitization activities that are
orthogonal to real economy and monetary policy innovations account for more
than 30 percent of U.S. output variation. The dynamic effects, however,
depend on the type of shock. Expansionary securitization shocks lead to a
permanent rise in real GDP and a fall in inflation. Bank lending and risk-
taking shocks, in contrast, have only a temporary effect on real GDP and tend
to lead to a (moderate) rise in the price level. Furthermore, there is evidence
for a strong search-for-yield effect on the side of investors in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. These effects are estimated with a structural
VAR model, where the shocks are identified using a model of bank risk-taking
and securitization.
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1 Introduction
The experiences of recent years have emphasized the need for a better understanding
of the links between the financial sector and the real economy. While substantial
effort has been devoted to this topic, some key questions remain. One of them is the
importance of shocks originating from within the financial sector relative to shocks
from the real side of the economy, as well as the question of what the sources of
these financial shocks are.
Many observers, for instance, agree that increased risk-taking at banks resulted
in excessive lending in the early 2000s, subsequently contributing to the crisis of
2007-2008. However, it is less clear what led to this increased appetite for risk.
One view is that it was caused by changes in the financial system, such as greater
risk-shifting opportunities coupled with skewed incentive schemes (see e.g. Rajan
2005). An alternative interpretation is that the risk-taking behavior of banks was
mainly driven by developments external to the banking sector. For example, loose
monetary policy has been blamed for providing banks with incentives to take on
excessive risk prior to the crisis, the so-called “risk-taking channel” of monetary
policy (e.g. Adrian and Shin 2010; Jiménez et al. 2009; Ioannidou et al. 2009;
Maddaloni and Peydró 2011).
Similarly, there is a broad understanding that securitization was an important
driver of the lending boom prior to the crisis, as well as a major factor contributing to
the subprime crisis. For example, Keys et al. (2010) and Purnanandam (2011) have
shown that the widespread use of securitization affected bank behavior both in terms
of amount and quality of loans. Again, it is not clear what triggered the changes
in securitization markets. On the one hand, it may be due to financial innovation
which made it easier for banks to transfer risks to investors. On the other hand,
securitization may also have been driven by changes outside securitization markets,
such as shifts in the stance of monetary policy that altered investors’ appetite for
risky assets.1
1Borio and Zhu (2008) argue that low interest rates lead to a higher appetite and demand for
securitization products by investors, which is often called the “search for yield” effect of monetary
policy. On the other hand, banks typically use securitization to buffer the effects of monetary
policy. In particular, lower interest rates reduce the supply of securitization by banks because it is
cheaper and easier to finance the loans on-balance sheet (Kuttner 2000; Estrella 2002; Loutskina
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Separating shocks which originate in banks and securitization markets from other
shocks is clearly important for understanding how the financial system interacts with
the macro-economy. It should help us in assessing the overall role of the financial
system in creating as well as amplifying shocks, which is an important input into the
design of financial regulation. For example, the scope for regulation is more limited
if fluctuations in financial variables mainly arise in response to shocks to the real
economy. Furthermore, isolating different types of financial shocks is a prerequisite
for studying the macroeconomic consequences of these shocks. Different types of
financial shocks may affect output and prices differently, and hence require different
policy responses.
In this paper, we analyze the link between the banking sector, securitization
markets and the macro-economy with a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR)
model. The advantage of an SVAR approach is that it requires us to impose only
a limited structure on the data. Since we are interested in isolating shocks that
can be clearly attributed to the financial system, we restrict the analysis to a set
of financial shocks that are orthogonal to real economy disturbances and monetary
policy innovations. The shocks are identified with restrictions that are obtained from
a parsimonious theoretical model of bank risk-taking and securitization. Specifically,
we identify three financial shocks. A risk-taking shock alters banks’ cost - real or
perceived - of holding risks on their balance sheet. It may arise for instance due
to an underpricing of risk or moral hazard caused by bailout expectations.2 A
securitization shock makes it more attractive for banks to securitize loans. It can
be the result, for instance, of financial innovation or a change in the demand for
securitized assets. Finally, a lending shock is a shock that makes it more profitable
for banks to extend loans, for example, because of a reduction in monitoring costs
or because of a rise in the demand for loans which is not caused by developments in
the real economy.
We estimate the SVAR for the United States (U.S.) over the sample period 1970-
2008. The results show that the identified financial shocks are an important source
of macroeconomic fluctuations. Together, they account for more than 30 percent of
and Strahan 2009; Loutskina 2011).
2Our modeling approach does not require us to take a stance on the precise nature of a given
shock; it thus captures the diversity of reasons why a shock may occur.
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U.S. output variation. The dynamic effects are, however, very different. Expansion-
ary securitization shocks lead to a permanent rise in real GDP accompanied by a
fall in inflation. In other words, a pattern which is typically found for technology
or cost-push shocks (despite the fact that securitization shocks are orthogonal to
real economy innovations on impact). Lending shocks and risk-taking shocks, in
contrast, only have a temporary effect on economic activity and they tend to lead
to a (moderate) rise in the price level. Different financial shocks may thus require
different policy responses.
Within the SVAR, we also estimate the effects of monetary policy shocks on bank
lending and securitization markets. The estimations reveal that there is a surge in
the volume of securitization on impact after an expansionary monetary policy shock,
suggesting a strong search-for-yield effect on the side of investors in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. Another interesting finding of our analysis is that
changes in securitization and retained loans by banks are predominantly driven by
shocks unrelated to risk-taking and securitization markets. This suggests that a
large part of the observed fluctuations in securitization and risk-taking in the data
is in fact an endogenous response to developments elsewhere in the economy.
The present study is related to the literature that focuses on modeling the in-
teractions between the financial system and the macro-economy. In recent years,
substantial effort has been devoted to incorporating financial frictions in macroeco-
nomic models. While standard RBC-models do not have an explicit role for the
financial sector, following Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the literature has empha-
sized the role of the financial system as an accelerator of shocks (e.g. Kiyotaki and
Moore 1997; Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997; Bernanke et al. 1999). More recent pa-
pers have emphasized that the financial accelerator itself can be a source of shocks.
Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) consider shocks to the efficiency of financial interme-
diation, Gilchrist et al. (2009) allow for shocks to the financial accelerator itself,
while Jermann and Quadrini (2012) incorporate shocks that affect the borrowing
capacity of firms. Besides shocks to the financial accelerator, the literature has em-
phasized other types of financial shocks. For instance, Christiano et al. (2010) allow
for a financial wealth shock (a shock to the value of capital in the economy) and a
risk-shock (a shock to the distribution of returns). Caldara et al. (2013) separately
identify financial shocks and uncertainty shocks. Our paper contributes to this liter-
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ature by considering a set of financial shocks that have not been explicitly analyzed
before, i.e. securitization, risk-taking and lending shocks.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the benchmark SVAR,
as well as the model-based identification strategy to disentangle the shocks. The
estimation results are presented in section 3, while section 4 discusses the robustness
of the results. Section 5 concludes and considers some implications for financial
regulation and macroeconomic policies.
2 Identification of financial shocks
Isolating different types of financial shocks is challenging because financial variables
interact with each other and also depend on the state of the economy. The challenge
is to identify movements in financial variables that are not reactive to other variables,
that is, to identify exogenous movements. In this section, we explain our approach
to isolate such exogenous movements.
In our analysis we will use SVAR models. Such models are often used to esti-
mate the effects of monetary policy shocks. They capture the dynamic relationships
between macroeconomic variables within a linear model. By imposing a minimum
set of restrictions on the model, they allow decomposition of the innovations to the
variables into mutually orthogonal shocks with a structural interpretation. Once
the shocks are identified, the dynamic effects on all the variables in the model can
be measured, controlling for other changes in the economic environment that may
have an independent effect on the variables.
Our SVAR has the following representation:
Zt = α+A(L)Zt−1 +Bεt (1)
where Zt is a vector of endogenous variables containing respectively output (yt),
inflation (πt), the federal funds rate (it) and a set of so-called flow of funds variables
from the Flow of Funds database: the amount of bank lending (lt), the amount of
loans securitized by banks (st) and the amount of loans retained by banks (rt).3
3Notice that the sum of retained and securitized loans is equal to bank lending. However, since
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The term α is a vector of constants, A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag op-
erator L, and B the contemporaneous impact matrix of the mutually uncorrelated
disturbances εt.
We are interested in identifying three financial shocks (lending, securitization
and risk-taking), but also monetary policy shocks, as this allows us to analyze how
such shocks affect financial variables. In order to isolate the four shocks, we use a
combination of zero and sign restrictions on the contemporaneous impact matrix B
of equation (1). The set of restrictions to uniquely disentangle the disturbances is
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Identification of structural shocks
yt πt it lt st rt
Monetary policy shock 0 0 - ? ? ?
Bank lending shock 0 0 0 + + +
Securitization shock 0 0 0 + + -
Risk-taking shock 0 0 0 + - +
yt = output, πt = inflation, it = federal funds rate, lt = lending, st = securitization,
rt = retained loans
We follow Christiano et al. (1996) in order to separate real economy shocks from
monetary policy and financial shocks. First, we assume that real economy and mon-
etary policy shocks can have an immediate effect on the flow of funds variables
(bank lending, securitization and retained loans), whereas shocks in banking and
securitization markets do not affect the real economy and monetary policy actions
on impact (we later analyze the robustness of the results by also allowing for an
immediate response of the federal funds rate to the financial shocks). Second, mon-
etary policy shocks are assumed to have no contemporaneous impact on output and
inflation, but may affect the financial variables on impact. Taken together, this
implies that any contemporaneous correlation between the VAR disturbances to the
flow of funds variables and the other variables is assumed to reflect causation from
the latter to the flow of funds variables, and not the other way around. This as-
sumption is conservative in our context, because it may lead us to underestimate the
we use logarithms for the estimations, this does not lead to collinearity in the SVAR.
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importance of financial shocks. The advantage of this approach, however, is that it
allows us to identify shocks in a simple and tractable way.4
Table 1 contains various (sign) restrictions that allow us to disentangle the finan-
cial shocks from each other. These restrictions are generated from a simple model
of a profit maximizing bank, which we discuss below.
2.1 A model of bank lending and securitization
We consider the representative bank of an economy. In the previous section we
have assumed that financial variables react contemporaneously to innovations in
the real economy and shifts in the monetary policy rate, but cannot influence real
economy variables and the policy rate on impact. Consistent with this, we analyze
the behavior of the representative bank, keeping constant the real economy and
monetary policy. Since we are also interested in the impact of monetary policy, we
will nonetheless also derive the reactions of the bank to monetary policy shocks.
In our simple model, the bank has to make two decisions. First, it decides how
many loans to extend to households and firms. Second, it decides how many of
these loans it wants to securitize. The remaining loans are funded on balance sheet
through deposits. Retaining loans on balance sheet subjects the bank to costs, which
we take as an (inverse) measure of the bank’s appetite for risk.
The bank faces a linear demand for loans given by (all parameters take positive
values):
L = l0 − l1(rL − εL), (2)
where l0 is a constant affecting the demand for loans (it may, for instance, depend
on economic activity), rL is the lending rate charged by the bank and εL is a lending
shock. This shock is an expansionary one as it permits banks charging higher rates rL
for given lending L.5 The lending shock can also be given a supply-side interpretation
as it may arise from a reduction in the cost of making loans for banks (in section
4Isolating the various shocks while allowing for a contemporaneous effect between all variables,
would require a much richer fully-fledged dynamic general equilibrium model with a banking and
securitization market. This is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
5Alternatively, one may model a shift in loan demand as an increase in demand for a given
interest rate. However, this specification is less suitable for solving the model.
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2.3 we provide an extensive discussion and examples of lending and other financial
shocks). In this case, rL− εL should be interpreted as the net return on lending for
the bank (net of any lending costs).
The bank also faces demand for securitized loans by investors:
S = s0 + s1(rS + εS)− s2rF , (3)
where s0 is a constant affecting the demand for securitization, rS is the return on
securitized loans, εS is a securitization shock and rF is the risk-free rate set by the
central bank. The securitization shock is expansionary as it allows the bank to charge
higher rates for a given amount of securitization. The shock could reflect changes
in investors’ appetite for securitization products (e.g. because of underpricing of
credit risk). It may also reflect reductions in the cost of securitization (e.g. due to
financial innovation), in which case rS+εS is the banks’ net-return (after costs) from
securitization. The risk-free rate rF affects securitization demand (negatively) by
increasing investors’ opportunity costs. This captures the search for yield channel
of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu 2008).
The costs of retaining a unit of loan on balance sheet consist of two parts. First,
there is the cost of financing the loan with deposits. We assume that the cost of
deposit financing is equal to the risk-free rate, rF . Second, there is an extra cost
which captures all costs (direct and indirect) of holding loans on balance sheet:
rB = r0(S − L)− εB. (4)
Such costs may for instance occur due to forced liquidation in the event of stress. We
assume that the marginal cost of financing on balance sheet increases in the amount
of loans retained. Appendix A provides a microfoundation for this. Specifically, we
introduce bank runs that force costly liquidation of loans. Bank loans are assumed
to be heterogenous in their liquidation costs. The bank — aware of the risk of runs
— will hence first securitize the more illiquid loans. This implies that the quality
of retained loans falls when the bank keeps more of them, resulting in a higher
(marginal) cost of loan retention.6 The term εB in (4) is a risk-appetite shock,
6Convex on balance sheet costs create a link between optimal lending and securitization. Note
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which alters the (real or perceived) cost of holding risk on balance sheet.
Finally, the risk-free rate rF is determined by the monetary policy stance f0, and
an (expansionary) policy shock εF :
rF = f0 − εF . (5)
Consistent with our assumption made in the previous section, f0 is exogenous for
the representative bank, and hence a constant in our analysis (in section 4 we will
allow the policy rate to also respond to the financial shocks).
The timing is as follows. There are two dates, date 0 and 1. At date 0, monetary
policy and financial shocks are revealed. Thereafter, lending and securitization
decisions take place. In particular, the bank decides upon how much to lend L, and
how many loans to securitize S. Securitization takes place by placing the loans in
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which issues securities with a face value of S to
investors. The part of the loans that are not securitized are financed by borrowing
B at rate rF . The bank’s budget constraint at date 0 is therefore:
L = S +B. (6)
At date 1, the SPV distributes the return on the securitized loans, (1 + rL)S, to
investors minus a management fee for the bank, (rL− rS)S. Thus, investors receive
a net return of rSS and the bank receives (rL − rS)S.
The bank’s profits at date 1 consist of the repayment on retained loans, (1 +
rL)(L − S), the securitization fee, (rL − rS)S, minus the repayment to depositors,
(1+rF )B, and the cost of retaining loans, rB(L−S). Using equation (6) to substitute
for B we obtain for bank profits:
Π(L, S) = rLL− rSS − (rB + rF )(L− S). (7)
The optimization problem of the bank can hence be written as:
max
L,S
Π(L, S), subject to L ≥ S ≥ 0. (8)
that such costs also arise when the supply of funds is inelastic for the bank.
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2.2 Comparative statics
In this section we derive the (qualitative) impact of each of the four shocks (the
lending shock εL, the securitization shock εS, the risk-taking shock εB and the policy
shock εF ) on bank lending L, securitization S and retained lending R (R = L− S).
For this we presume that the parameters of the model are such that interior solutions
obtain.
We can use equations (2)-(5) to substitute rL, rS, rB and rF in the profit function,
i.e. equation (7). We obtain:












+ εL + εB − 2r0(L∗ − S∗)− f0 + εF = 0 (10)
Π0(S) =
s0 − s2(f0 − εF )− 2S∗
s1
+ εS − εB + 2r0(L∗ − S∗)− f0 + εF = 0.(11)
From (10) and (11), we obtain for L∗, S∗ and R∗ (= L∗ − S∗):
L∗ =
l0 + l1(εL + εB − f0 + εF ) + r0l1
³
s0 − s2(f0 − εF ) + s1( l0l1 + εL + εS)
´
2(1 + r0(l1 + s1))
(12)
S∗ =





+ εL + εS)
´
2(1 + (l1 + s1)r0)
(13)
R∗ =
l0 − s0 + s2(f0 − εF ) + l1(εL + εB − f0 + εF )− s1(εS − εB + f0 − εF )
2(1 + (l1 + s1)r0)
. (14)
Propositions 1-4 characterize the comparative statics with respect to the four shocks.
Proposition 1 An expansionary bank lending shock εL
(i) increases bank lending L∗,
(ii) increases securitization S∗,
(iii) increases retained loans R∗.
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Proof. From equations (12)-(14), we obtain L∗0(εL) =
l1(1+r0s1)
2(1+(l1+s1)r0)
> 0; S∗0(εL) =
s1r0l1
2(1+(l1+s1)r0)
> 0; R∗0(εL) = l12(1+(l1+s1)r0) > 0
The intuition behind these results is as follows. First, an increase in the lending
rate for a given amount of loans (an expansionary lending shock), makes it optimal
for the bank to increase lending. Higher lending, ceteris paribus, increases the
amount of retained loans. As this increases the marginal costs of retaining risk, it
becomes desirable for the bank to securitize part of the additional loans. As a result,
securitization increases as well.7 All bank variables thus increase following a lending
shock.
Proposition 2 An expansionary securitization shock εS
(i) increases bank lending L∗,
(ii) increases securitization S∗,
(iii) decreases retained loans R∗.




> 0; R∗0(εS) = −s12(1+(l1+s1)r0) < 0
The proposition shows that a securitization shock increases equilibrium secu-
ritization, which is because such a shock increases the return for the bank from
securitizing, making it profitable for the bank to securitize more loans. Higher
securitization, ceteris paribus, reduces the loans retained by the bank. As a conse-
quence, the bank’s (marginal) cost of on balance sheet risk falls, making it attractive
for the bank to partially offset the reduction in retained risk through an expansion
in lending. Hence, lending increases.
Proposition 3 An expansionary risk-taking shock εB
(i) increases bank lending L∗,
(ii) decreases securitization S∗,
(iii) increases retained loans R∗.
7Note that if the costs of retaining loans were constant (r0 = 0), securitization would be
unchanged. In the empirical analysis, we will use weak sign restrictions to accommodate this.
11




< 0; R∗0(εB) = l1+s12(1+(l1+s1)r0) > 0
Proposition 3 shows that the effect of a higher risk appetite of the bank, i.e. a
reduced cost of retaining risk, is to increase lending and lower securitization. This is
because a bank then desires to have more loans on its balance sheet, which it achieves
by increasing lending and lowering the amount of securitization. In other words, the
profit-maximizing bank uses both possible channels (lending and securitization) to
expand balance sheet risk.
Proposition 4 An expansionary monetary policy shock εF
(i) increases bank lending L∗,
(ii) has an ambiguous impact on securitization S∗,
(iii) has an ambiguous impact on retained loans R∗.
Proof. From equations (12)-(14), we obtain L∗0(εF ) =
l1(1+r0s2)
2(1+(l1+s1)r0)
> 0; S∗0(εF ) =
s2(1+r0l1)−s1
2(1+(l1+s1)r0)
≶ 0; R∗0(εF ) = l1+s1−s22(1+(l1+s1)r0) ≶ 0
The reason why an expansionary policy shock (a reduction in the risk-free rate)
increases equilibrium lending is due to two, independent, channels that are operating
in our model. First, a lower policy rate makes it more attractive for the bank to
finance loans on balance sheet, and in order to achieve this, it will increase lending.
This is the so-called “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy (Adrian and Shin
2010). Second, a lower interest rate reduces the opportunity costs for investors. As
a result, they demand more securitization assets, which increases the bank’s optimal
lending amount for the same reason as when a securitization shock hits. This is
the “search-for-yield” effect on the side of investors (Borio and Zhu 2008). Note
that these effects of monetary policy are distinct from risk-taking and securitization
shocks which arise independently of monetary policy.
The impact of a monetary policy shock on securitization and retained loans,
however, is undetermined. The reason is that there are two offsetting effects. On the
one hand, a lower policy rate lowers the cost of funding on balance sheet for the bank.
This increases the incentives for risk-taking, while reducing the incentive to securitize
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loans. On the other hand, a lower policy rate increases the demand for securitization
assets by investors. This increases the bank’s profits from securitization, leading to
more securitization and less risk-taking. The net effect depends on the parameters
of the model. The estimations will determine which effect dominates.
The sign restrictions delivered by Propositions 1-4 are the ones presented in
Table 1. There is one exception. In the empirical analysis, we will not impose that
a monetary policy shock increases lending (as suggested in Proposition 4). This
is because this restriction is not needed to identify the shock, which allows us to
evaluate whether the (estimated) lending impact of the shock conforms to the one
predicted by the model. Note also that our model uniquely allows us to disentangle
all shocks (that is, no two shocks can have the same responses).8
2.3 What are lending, risk-taking and securitization shocks?
The model provides a structure for interpreting the shocks that we identify in the
empirical section. Recall that all three financial shocks are (contemporaneously)
orthogonal to general macroeconomic conditions (output, inflation and the monetary
policy rate). A lending shock hence refers to a shock that makes bank lending more
attractive, taking as given macroeconomic conditions, the risk-taking appetite of
banks and securitization markets. Similarly, a securitization shock refers to a change
in securitization markets unrelated to macroeconomic conditions, lending markets
and the risk appetite of banks. A risk-taking shock, finally, is a shock that affects
bank risk-taking at given macroeconomic conditions and taking as given conditions
in lending and securitization markets. In this section we provide some examples for
the three shocks.
Lending shocks
• Reduction in monitoring and screening costs. When the cost of extending
loans declines (for example, because of technological progress), banks will find
it more attractive to extend loans.
8Our model permits the identification of financial shocks using balance sheet information only
— this is a key advantage since quality data on lending rates and prices of securitization products
is not available for a longer horizon.
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• Increase in house prices. An (exogenous) rise in house prices can increase the
demand for bank loans due to a wealth effect, and the supply of loans since
higher collateral value alleviates borrowing constraints (see e.g. Dell’Ariccia
et al. 2012).
• Rise in expected economic activity. When households and firms anticipate a
future increase in economic activity, this can lead to an increase in the demand
for loans. Similarly, the supply of loans could increase because the expected
default rate on the loans declines.
Securitization shocks
• Financial innovation that improves securitization technologies. Transferring
risks off the balance sheet causes moral hazard and adverse selection prob-
lems. Securitization techniques, such as the tranching and pooling of loans
or the provision of liquidity lines to SPV have the potential to reduce costs
stemming from asymmetric information (see e.g. DeMarzo 2005). Notably,
this was the dominant view prior to the crisis of 2007-2008. By reducing inef-
ficiencies associated with securitization, financial innovation may thus lead to
a securitization shock.
• Development of securitization markets. Securitization on a large scale requires
well-functioning markets. Improvements in securitization markets are thus a
source of (positive) securitization shocks. By contrast, a breakdown of secu-
ritization markets (as observed during the crisis of 2007-2008) constitutes a
negative securitization shock.
• Higher risk-appetite by investors or underpricing of credit risk by investors.
A leading explanation for the surge in securitization in the years before the
crisis is that investors did not fully understand the risks involved and hence
accepted an insufficient compensation for taking on risks. Consistent with
such an investor-driven explanation, Nadauld and Sherlund (2009) show that
demand in the secondary market for mortgages has led to a higher supply of
credit in the primary mortgage market.
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• Savings glut. The increase in securitization activity is often attributed to an
increased supply of funds by investors from outside the U.S.. Bernanke (2005)
coined this phenomenon the global “savings glut”. Shin (2009) provides for
instance evidence that emerging markets funds were largely channeled towards
mortgage debt securities, and not predominantly U.S. government securities.
• Regulatory arbitrage. The Basel II treatment of securitization for the calcula-
tion of capital requirements was favorable. It has been argued that this was a
key driver behind securitization as it allowed banks to lower required capital.
Risk-taking shocks
• Decline in liquidation risk. If the risk of stress at banks declines, it becomes
desirable for banks to hold more risk on balance sheet as they then face a lower
likelihood of costly fire-sales.
• Risk-shifting. The put-option associated with equity gives bank managers
and shareholders incentives to take on excessive risks (Jensen and Meckling
1976). Increases in the value of the put-option (for example, because of higher
leverage) will incentivize banks to take on more risk. Risk-shifting incentives
also become more pronounced when debtors underprice default risk, allowing
the bank to finance risk at lower rates.
• Capital requirements. Regulators require banks to hold capital depending on
the risk of their balance sheets. Since holding capital is costly for banks,
variations in capital requirements will change the risk appetite of the bank.
For instance, the introduction of the advanced approach for calculating capital
requirements under Basel II allowed large banks to lower their capital, lowering
their costs of risk-taking.
• Cost of capital. Any change in the economy (orthogonal to output and mone-
tary policy innovations) that either changes the availability or costs of funding
for banks will affect the extent to which banks can (and want to) take on new
risks, and hence constitutes a risk-taking shock.
15
• Bail-out expectations. Financial development in the decades before the crisis
of 2007-2008 has led to an increase in systemic risk because of factors such
as higher bank size and interconnectedness. This has arguably raised the
expectation of government bail-outs, increasing risk-taking incentives at banks.
• Compensation of bank managers and traders. The increasing dominance of
skewed compensations (such as through options or bonuses) leads to higher
payoffs in good states but limits losses in bad states. This makes it (privately)
optimal to take on more risk (see e.g. Rajan 2005).
3 Empirical evidence
3.1 Data and estimation
Our empirical model includes real GDP, GDP deflator inflation, the federal funds
rate and the amount of bank lending, securitization and retained loans. All variables
are seasonally adjusted natural logarithms (multiplied by 100), except the interest
rate, which is in percent. Estimation in (log) levels allows for implicit cointegrating
relationships in the data (Sims et al. 1990). The sample period is 1970Q1-2008Q4.
2008Q4 is the quarter in which the federal funds rate hit the zero lower bound.
From that quarter on the FED resorted to non-standard policy measures, which
could distort the identification and estimation results. The estimations include four
lags of the endogenous variables, based on standard likelihood ratio tests and the
usual lag-length selection criteria.9
Real GDP, the GDP deflator and the federal funds rate are obtained from the
FRED database. The Flow of Funds database provides the information on lending
and securitization activities. Due to data constraints, we focus the analysis on
mortgages and consumer credits, which represent the dominant form of securitization
activities (at the end of our example, they cover about 88% of the stock of total
securitization activities). Lending is the total amount of mortgage and consumer
loans outstanding, while securitization is the total outstanding stock of securitized
9Most criteria suggest even less lags. The results are however robust to different choices of the
lag length.
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mortgage and consumer credits (in the case of mortgages this includes commercial
mortgages as well as government-sponsored mortgages).10
Figure 1 shows the fraction of loans securitized over the sample period. While
the propensity to securitize was very limited at the beginning of the sample (less
than 1% of lending), we can see a clear increase in securitization during the sample
period. At the end of the sample, nearly half of the loans are securitized. We
also note that there are significant deviations from the trend, which may reflect
securitization shocks.
We estimate an SVAR for model (2) using the restrictions on the contempo-
raneous impact matrix B of Table 1. Estimation and inference uses the Bayesian
approach developed in Peersman (2005) or Uhlig (2005) (see these papers for a de-
tailed explanation). The prior and posterior distributions of the reduced form VAR
belong to the Normal-Wishart family. To draw the “candidate truths” from the
posterior, we take a joint draw from the unrestricted Normal-Wishart posterior for
the VAR parameters as well as a random possible decomposition B of the variance-
covariance matrix, which allows the construction of impulse response functions. If
the impulse response functions from a particular draw satisfy the imposed restric-
tions, the draw is kept. Otherwise, the draw is rejected by giving it a zero prior
weight. We only impose the sign restrictions on the contemporaneous effects. Each
draw is required to satisfy the restrictions of all identified shocks simultaneously.
Finally, a total of 10000 successful draws from the posterior are used to produce the
figures.
3.2 Dynamic effects of bank lending, securitization and risk-
taking shocks
Figures 2-4 show the impulse responses to a one standard deviation innovation in
bank lending, securitization and risk-taking shocks. The shaded (light blue) areas
10Securitization data for consumer loans is only available from 1989 onwards. Since consumer
loan securitization is only about 5% of total securitization in our data, we do not adjust our analysis
for this (moreover, when we exclude consumer credits from our analysis, the results remain very
similar). Note also that securitization is only one form of credit risk transfer, although the dominant
one (for example, at the end of our sample, the net-positions of U.S. commercial banks in credit
derivatives was only about 2% of their assets).
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represent the 68 percent posterior probability regions of the estimated effects, and
the dotted (red) line the median of the posterior distribution.
Lending shocks are identified as those shocks that shift bank lending, securiti-
zation and retained loans on impact in the same direction, whilst being orthogonal
to innovations in output, inflation and monetary policy. As shown in Figure 2, the
joint rise in all three flow of funds variables after an expansionary lending shock
is very persistent. Furthermore, there is a hump-shaped (and significant) change
in economic activity, which only returns to baseline after approximately five years.
There is a positive but insignificant effect on the price level, whereas the federal
funds rate temporarily increases.11
The dynamic effects of securitization shocks are quite different, as can be seen
from Figure 3. On the one hand, there is a significant and permanent rise of real
GDP. On the other hand, inflation declines shortly after the shock, resulting in a
permanent fall of the price level in the long run. Thus, a securitization shock has
the properties typically associated with technology or permanent cost-push shocks.
Notably, this is despite the fact that the shocks are orthogonal to innovations in
output and prices. The magnitudes are economically relevant. A typical securitiza-
tion shock raises the amount of securitization by 1 percent, leading to a permanent
rise in real GDP of 0.3 percent, and a fall of the price level by 0.3 percent.
Figure 4 shows that a shock to risk-taking has a significant impact on output as
well, but the pattern is similar to that of an aggregate demand shock. Specifically,
a positive risk-taking shock is followed by a rise in economic activity that peaks
after one year, and gradually returns to baseline afterwards. There is a modest
(insignificant) rise in the price level. The expansion of the amount of retained loans
is also temporary.
The different macroeconomic effects of securitization and risk-taking shocks is
striking. Securitization shocks over the sample period have arguably been driven to
a large extent by financial innovation. As such, they reflect a technological process
and hence can be expected to be similar to productivity shocks in the economy. Since
they are orthogonal to economic activity, these are productivity shocks originating
11Impulse responses of inflation have been accumulated in the figures, in order to better assess
the effect on the price level.
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from within the financial system. Our findings that are suggestive of technology
shocks originating from within the financial system add to the debate on the con-
tribution of the financial system to the economy.12 Risk-taking shocks, in contrast,
probably fit better the notion of animal spirits. They seem to be driven by changes
in sentiment that can drive output — without having a lasting effect.
3.3 Monetary policy and risk-taking in the financial system
The impact of monetary policy shocks on standard macroeconomic variables is in
line with the existing evidence (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder 1992; Christiano et al.
1999; Peersman and Smets 2003). Figure 5 shows that there is a hump-shaped effect
on economic activity, and a persistent rise of prices after an expansionary monetary
policy shock. There is also a deflationary effect of monetary policy in the short run,
the so-called “price-puzzle”. Note that monetary policy shocks also increase lending
— which is predicted by our model but was not imposed in the SVAR.
More interestingly, our analysis can also be used to shed some light on the role
of securitization and risk-taking in the monetary transmission mechanism. The
literature has emphasized two different channels. Borio and Zhu (2008) argue that
monetary policy affects the risk-taking incentives of investors (“search for yield”), as
lower interest rates increase their appetite for higher-yielding securitization assets.
Separate from this channel (which operates through investors and the demand for
securitization), a fall in the risk-free interest rate reduces the cost of financing loans
on balance sheet, leading to more lending by banks. This is the risk-taking channel
of monetary policy (Adrian and Shin 2010).13
The two channels have different implications in our model. A search-for-yield
effect has an impact similar to a securitization shock (as it increases the demand
for securitization). It hence leads to higher securitization and less loan retention
12It should be noted that we cannot assess whether the overall contribution of securitization
shocks was positive or negative — since all securitization shocks add to zero by definition.
13Using Spanish credit registry data, Jiménez et al. (2009) find that lower interest rates increase
risk-taking at banks by causing banks to lend to borrowers with higher default risk. Ioannidou et
al. (2009) find evidence for the risk-taking channel in Bolivia. Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) show
that low short-term interest rates soften lending standards at banks. They also find that this effect
is related to securitization activities.
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(Proposition 2). The risk-taking channel is equivalent to a (positive) shock to risk-
taking, and has the opposite impact: less securitization and higher loan retention
(Proposition 3).14 We can hence use the empirical estimates to learn about the
relative importance of the two channels.
As can be seen in Figure 5, following a monetary policy shock, there is a strong
increase in the volume of securitization on impact, whereas the volume of retained
loans only starts to rise after some quarters. This suggests the existence of a search-
for-yield channel of monetary policy or, to be precise, a search-for-yield channel that
dominates the risk-taking channel in the short-run.
3.4 Macroeconomic relevance
While impulse responses show how the economy responds to various shocks, they do
not tell us how important these shocks are for explaining macroeconomic fluctua-
tions. To assess the macroeconomic relevance, Figure 6 shows the posterior distribu-
tions of the long-run forecast error variance decompositions of, respectively, output,
securitization and retained loans. For each variable, we show the contribution of the
four shocks that we have identified, as well as the sum of bank lending, securitization
and risk-taking shocks to assess the overall relevance of financial disturbances. The
figure also reports the medians of the distributions.15
The output variance decompositions in Figure 6 show that the macroeconomic
relevance of shocks specific to the financial system is considerable. The three fi-
nancial disturbances together explain approximately one-third of output variation.
Lending and securitization shocks are each equally important drivers of the U.S.
business cycle as monetary policy shocks. Risk-taking shocks are less important,
14Formally, this can be derived by setting s2 = 0 and taking the derivative of S∗ and R∗
(equations (12) and (13)) with respect to εF . Note that an additional effect of monetary policy
may arise through the demand side (see e.g. Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai 2005, who argue that
monetary policy prior to the crisis has led to higher housing demand).
15We show the entire distribution of the contribution to the forecast error variance to take into
account the issues raised in Fry and Pagan (2007). Fry and Pagan criticize the use of median values
(and percentiles) for variance decompositions on the grounds that reported values across variables
and shock are not simultaneously generated by a single model in the case of sign restrictions, but
come from different models. A consequence is that the contribution of the shocks may not sum up
to one. Notice also that the median of the sum of the three shocks is mostly higher than the sum
of the medians.
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explaining approximately 5-6 percent of the variability. The overall importance of
financial shocks is noteworthy, given our conservative identification strategy that
attributes any contemporaneous movements in real variables to the real side of the
economy.
Another interesting question is what the drivers of fluctuations in financial vari-
ables are. Are they caused by the financial shock itself, by other financial shocks, or
developments outside the financial system? The decompositions of the forecast error
variance for securitization and retained loans in Figure 6 show that surprisingly little
is explained by the shock itself. In particular, securitization shocks only explain less
than 10 percent of the long-run variability of the amount of securitization, while
risk-taking shocks explain somewhat more than 10 percent of the long-run variabil-
ity of retained loans. Fluctuations in these variables are hence mainly driven by
other shocks. These are bank lending shocks and other shocks to the real economy
that we do not identify in our analysis. Bank lending shocks in particular contribute
approximately 40 percent to the variability of the amount of securitization and re-
tained loans. Interestingly, monetary policy shocks explain little of the variability
of both variables.
These findings suggest that securitization activities and on balance sheet risk
at banks are mainly a response to other developments in the economy, including
developments in lending markets. This is important to keep in mind when analyz-
ing observed changes in the financial system. For example, while one may naively
interpret a surge in securitization activities as originating in securitization markets,
it may really reflect higher demand for financing in the economy. Notwithstanding
this “passivity” of securitization and on balance sheet risk, shocks to these markets
are of large macroeconomic importance — as the output decompositions have shown.
4 Contemporaneous monetary policy response
Following Christiano et al. (1996), we have assumed that monetary policy does
not react on impact to the financial shocks. In this section, we analyze the case
where the central bank can contemporaneously react to the disturbances in the
financial sector. In order to incorporate this into the model of section 2.1, we have
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to make assumptions about the central bank’s reaction function. Specifically, we
assume that the central bank reacts to shocks in order to stabilize lending, that
is, it systematically raises the interest rate on impact when there is a shock that
increases lending (and lowers it in response to a contractionary shock).16 A second
assumption we make is that the demand for securitized assets is more sensitive to
the return on the asset itself than to the return on the alternative safe investment
(i.e. the monetary policy rate). This assumption implies that s1 ≥ s2 in equation
(3) of the benchmark model and ensures that the sign predictions for securitization
shocks are unambiguous. Appendix B shows that this assumption is fulfilled for a
standard portfolio problem of a risk-averse investor who allocates his wealth between
different assets (two of them being securitized loans and the safe asset).
Appendix C contains the derivations for the comparative statics of the modified
model. Table 2 summarizes the results.
Table 2: Comparative statics when monetary policy is endogenous
it lt st rt
Monetary policy shock - + ? +
Bank lending shock + + + ?
Securitization shock + + + -
Risk-taking shock + + - +
it = federal funds rate, lt = lending, st = securitization, rt = retained loans
The signs are identical to those of the baseline model, except in three instances.
First, monetary policy now reacts to all expansionary financial shocks with an in-
crease in the interest rate. Second, the impact of a lending shock on loan retention
is ambiguous. The reason is that monetary authorities stabilize lending following a
lending shock by raising the policy rate, which may reduce loan retention through
the risk-taking channel. A lending shock can hence no longer be separated from a
securitization shock. However, the model delivers an alternative restriction to dis-
entangle both shocks. As shown in Proposition 8 in Appendix C, the proportion of
16This is the only internally consistent stabilization policy since our model is one of banking
(and not of output and inflation).
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securitized loans, S∗/L∗, increases more after an (expansionary) securitization shock
than after an (expansionary) lending shock. The last change is that the effect of
a monetary policy shock on retained loans is now an unambiguously positive one.
This is, however, solely the result of the assumption that s1 ≥ s2 and has no bearing
on our analysis as monetary policy shocks are already identified uniquely. We can
hence let the data decide on the monetary policy impact for retained loans.
We rerun the analysis using the sign restrictions in Table 2, dropping the restric-
tion on the impact of monetary policy on retained lending, and adding the condition
that S/L responds more to a securitization shock than a lending shock. We also
add the zero contemporaneous restrictions on output and prices already used in the
benchmark estimations. Figure 7 shows the estimated impulse response functions.
As can be seen, the dynamic effects of securitization, risk-taking and monetary pol-
icy shocks are very similar to the benchmark analysis. The impact of lending shocks
on GDP, however, declines and is now insignificant. A reduced impact of lending
shocks is probably due to the (imposed) policy tightening on impact.
5 Summary and policy implications
This paper has considered the macroeconomic importance of shocks to bank lending,
risk-taking and securitization. Bank lending shocks arise from changes in the econ-
omy that affect banks’ incentives to extend loans, keeping constant the real side of
the economy. Shocks to risk-taking increase the incentives for banks to retain loans
on balance sheet, while securitization shocks raise the demand for securitized assets
or lower the cost of securitization. Importantly, monetary policy is distinct from
these shocks and has a separate impact on both bank risk-taking and securitization.
A simple model of a profit-maximing representative bank delivered identifying
conditions for each shock. The model-implied restrictions were then used to esti-
mate a structural VAR for the U.S. economy over the sample period 1970-2008. The
estimations show that bank lending, securitization and risk-taking shocks have im-
portant consequences for the macro-economy. In particular, they explain together
around one-third of U.S. output variability. Bank lending and risk-taking shocks
have a temporary effect on economic activity, while the impact of securitization
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shocks is permanent.17 Securitization shocks also lead to a decline in inflation. We
also find evidence for a strong search-for-yield effect on the side of investors in the
monetary transmission mechanism.
There are important messages for macroeconomic policies. Given that financial
shocks are a significant source of macroeconomic fluctuations, policy makers need
to take into account the role of the financial system. This may imply attempts
to reduce the scope for the financial system to be a source of shocks. Current
regulatory efforts, in particular aimed at curbing risk-taking at banks and reducing
systemic risk in securitization markets, already go in that direction. In addition,
policy makers need to consider the potential for the financial system to be the origin
of shocks when reacting to fluctuations in the economy. In particular, our results
indicate that for the optimal policy response, the source of the shock is critical.
For instance, expansionary shocks originating in securitization markets resemble
productivity shocks with deflationary tendencies, while shocks caused by higher
risk-appetite, in contrast, tend to lead to higher inflation. On a practical level, this
implies that central banks should not only pay attention to changes in total lending
in the economy, but should also consider the contribution of banks (loan retention)
and markets (securitization) to such changes.
Finally, our results provide a cautionary note for interpreting changes in the
financial sector too readily. For example, it seems only natural to attribute fluctu-
ations in securitization to securitization markets themselves, with implications for
financial regulation. However, we find that only a small part of changes in securiti-
zation and risk-taking are caused by shocks to the respective variables themselves.
The fluctuations are hence largely a response to developments taking place elsewhere
in the economy. This emphasizes the need for clearly distinguishing between shocks
and endogenous responses in the financial system when undertaking policy analysis.
Our framework provides a simple means for doing this.
17We found that risk-taking shocks are relatively less important than securitization shocks. This
may be different in bank-based systems, such as continental Europe, where the importance of
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Appendix A: A model of bank risk-appetite
We modify the baseline model as follows. Suppose that there is also an intermediate
date t = 1
2
and that bank depositors face uncertainty about when they have to
consume (akin to Diamond and Dybvig 1983). In particular, with probability 1
2
all
depositors find out at date t = 1
2
that they can only consume at this date, while
with probability 1
2
they find out that they have to consume at t = 1. The deposit
contract gives depositors the right to withdraw at either t = 1
2
or t = 1.
If consumers in the economy turn out to be late consumers, there is no problem
at t = 1
2
as there is no incentive to run on the bank. The economy then proceeds as
in the baseline model. If consumers are of the early type, all consumers run on the
bank, which forces liquidation of the bank. Such liquidation (effectively, calling in
the loans the bank has made) is costly. In particular, we assume that a bank loses
γ per unit of loan where γ depends on the type of firm it has financed. We assume
that a firm’s type i is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and that the liquidation cost
for firm i takes the form
γ(i) = 4r0L · i+ 2− εB, (A1)
where we have r0 > 0 and εB denotes a risk-taking shock. Dependence on L captures
the idea that if the bank makes more loans, the average quality of loans suffers and
hence liquidation costs increase (dependence on L ensures that the cost function
becomes quadratic but is not necessary to produce convex costs).
We assume that firms are of infinitesimal small size and require one unit of funds
each. A firm’s type is discovered by the bank upon making the loan at date 0 but is
unknown to either bank or firm prior to this. A bank that lends to a measure L of
firms hence has a portfolio of types that is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] with density
L. Investors who buy securitized assets do not suffer from a liquidation problem
and do not care about which type they buy. It is hence optimal for the bank to
always securitize the loans with the highest liquidation costs. As a consequence, for
a securitization amount of S, the bank will retain a portfolio of firms whose types
are distributed with density L on [0, 1 − S
L
]. This implies that the more the firm
securitizes, the lower are the average liquidation costs of its remaining portfolio.




is no run at date t = 1
2
and the bank can collect rL(L−S) from firms at date 1. With
probability 1
2
there is a run at date 1. The bank then liquidates its loan portfolio




((1 + rL − γ(i))Ldi = (1 + rL)(L− S)− 2(r0(L− S)2 − εB(L− S)), (A2)
which the bank stores for date t = 1. The total expected revenue from retained
loans is hence (1 + rL)(L− S)− r0(L− S)2 + εB(L− S). The per-unit extra costs
of retaining loans are thus r0(L− S)− εB.
Variations in risk appetite in this setting are captured by the parameter εB.
Lower liquidation costs lead to lower cost of retaining loans, and hence increased
risk appetite. Alternatively, risk appetite may also fall when the likelihood of runs
increases or when bail-outs become less likely (bailouts can be interpreted in the
model as an action by the government that eliminates a run at t = 1
2
and lets the
bank continue until t = 1).
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Appendix B: The risk-free rate and the demand for
securitization
Suppose each investor is endowed with one unit of wealth. He can invest this wealth
either in a (risk-free) bond yielding a safe return of rF , in securitized assets (with
expected return rS and variance σ2S) or in an alternative risky asset (with expected
return rE and variance σ2E). The latter may for instance be an equity investment.
The correlation between the two assets is ρ and positive (ρ ∈ (0, 1]).
Denoting that share of wealth invested in securitized assets and alternative assets
with s and e, we obtain for the expected return and the variance of the investor’s
portfolio:
μ = 1 + srS + erE + (1− s− e)rF (B1)
σ2 = s2σ2S + e
2σ2S (B2)
Assuming mean-variance preferences with risk-aversion parameter α, we have for
the investor’s utility:




2σ2E + 2seρσSσE) (B3)
The first-order conditions for s and e are
rS − rF − α(s∗σ2S + e∗ρσSσE) = 0 (B4)
rE − rF − α(e∗σ2E + s∗ρσSσE) = 0 (B5)
Combining both equations to eliminate e∗ yields for the optimal investment in se-
curitized assets:
s∗ =





We have s0(rS) > 0 and s0(rF ) < 0 (as long as ρ σSσE ≤ 1), that is, an increase in the
return on securitized assets increases demand for the asset, while an increase in the
risk-free rate reduces investment in securitization assets. More importantly, we have
that |s0(rS)| ≥ |s0(rF )|. Hence, the demand for a securitization asset depends more
on the return on the asset itself than on the risk-free rate.
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Appendix C: A model with endogenous monetary
policy
In this appendix, we derive the sign predictions of the model when we allow for the
central bank to (contemporaneously) react to lending, securitization and risk-taking
shocks. We assume that the central bank (partially) stabilizes lending, that is, it
raises the interest rate when there is a shock that increases lending (and lowers it in
response to a contractionary shock). This can be motivated by output stabilization
objectives of central banks.
It is instructive to first consider an economy in which the central bank fully
stabilizes lending. Let us denote the target level of lending with L. Following a
shock, the central bank will adjust its monetary policy stance f0 such that the
resulting risk-free rate rF leads to lending of L by the bank. The (post-shock)
policy stance can be obtained by considering the equation for equilibrium lending
L∗ (equation (12)). This equation shows how bank lending depends on the various
shocks and the policy stance f0. Under full stabilization, the central bank will set f0
such that L∗ in (12) becomes identical to L. The post-shock monetary policy stance
can hence be obtained by setting L∗ = L in (12) and solving for f0. This yields:
f0(L = L) =
l0
l1
















As is to be expected, the policy stance increases in all four (expansionary) shocks,
that is, the central bank reacts in a contractionary manner to an expansionary shock.
Corollary 5 characterizes the comparative statics for securitization and loan re-
tention in the full stabilization economy.
Corollary 5 If the central bank were to fully stabilize lending, the equilibrium amount
of securitization S∗ (retained loans R∗)
(i) increases (decreases) in the lending shock εL,
(ii) increases (decreases) in the securitization shock εS,
(iii) decreases (increases) in the risk-taking shock εB,
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(iv) is independent (independent) of the policy shock εF .
Proof. Substituting f0 in the expression for securitization (13) using equation




































From (C3) we have that S∗0L=L(εL) =
s1−s2
2(1+r0s2)








< 0 and S∗0
L=L
(εF ) = 0. Noting that dRL=L =













> 0 and R∗0
L=L
(εF ) = 0.
The corollary shows that the predictions of the baseline model are reversed (in
the sense that the sign of the comparative statics becomes the opposite one) in one
case. While previously a lending shock led to more retained loans, it now decreases
loan retention. The reason is that following an expansionary lending shock, the
central bank raises the policy rate. This reduces the incentives to retain loans (see
Proposition 5), leading to an overall fall in loan retention when the central bank
raises the interest rate such that lending returns to its original level.
We can now derive the implications for the (more plausible) case of partial sta-
bilization, that is, following an expansionary shock the central bank still raises the
interest rate — but not by as much to make lending return fully to its pre-shock level.
Proposition 6 Partial stabilization does not alter the results of Propositions 1-3
except for the impact of a lending shock εL on retained loans R (Proposition 3). A
lending shock can now either decrease or increase retained loans.
Proof. Given that the impact of a change in the policy stance f0 on bank lending
is (strictly) negative (from (12)) we have that L∗0(f0) < 0), partial stabilization
implies that following an expansionary shock the central bank raises the policy stance
f0 by less than in the full stabilization case. Following an expansionary shock εi






(where fP0 denotes the
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policy stance under partial stabilization). Given the monotonic dependence of L,
S and R on the policy stance f0 (see equations (12), (13) and (14)), this implies
that the new equilibrium values of L, S and R lie strictly between the equilibrium
values under no stabilization and full stabilization. Using the comparative statics in
Corollary 5, we can then see that the results of Propositions 1-3 only change in the
case of a lending shock, which may now also reduce loan retention.
The endogeneity of monetary policy adds additional predictions, arising from
how the policy rate reacts to the various shocks. In the case of expansionary non-
policy shocks, the interest rate will obviously rise as the central bank tries to control
the economy. By contrast, in the case of a expansionary monetary policy shock,
interest rates fall as the central bank only partially offsets the negative shock to
rates:
Proposition 7 Under partial stabilization, the equilibrium risk-free rate r∗F
(i) increases in the lending shock εL,
(ii) increases in the securitization shock εS,
(iii) increases in the risk-taking shock εB,
(iv) decreases in the policy shock εF .
Proof. Parts (i)-(iii) follow from the fact that after an expansionary shock
εL, εS or εB, lending L rises (Proposition 1) and hence the central bank has to
increase f0 in order to stabilize L (from equation (12) we see that dL < 0 requires
dεF > 0). Part (iv): equation (12) for equilibrium lending shows that following an
expansionary policy shock (fall in εF ), f0 rises by less if L is partially stabilized.
Hence, rF (= f0 − εF ) falls.
Proposition 8 Under partial stabilization, the ratio of securitization to lending,
S∗/L∗, always increases more after an expansionary securitization shock than after
an expansionary lending shock.
Proof. Suppose that we observe a change in lending of dL∗ in the economy.
Denote the degree of (lending) stabilization by the central bank with γ (γ ∈ (0.1)),
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where γ = 0 denotes no stabilization and γ = 1 denotes full stabilization. We then
have that the lending response in the absence of stabilization is dL
∗
1−γ . This implies












Consider first the case of the change in lending being brought about by a securi-





df0, that is, the total change in
lending has to equal the direct effect from the securitization shock plus the indirect
one, coming from monetary policy. Solving for dεS allows us to determine the size




df0). The change in securitization















































1−α , we obtain for the difference in the change of securi-
tization under both shocks:























and hence dS(dεS) > dS(dεL). This
means that for a given change in lending in the economy, a securitization shock
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